For Suspension Clause purposes, we should define "habeas corpus" as a proceeding in which an independent court conducts an inquiry and determines whether a jailer is entitled to hold a prisoner. 1 All students exploring the field should keep their eyes firmly fixed on that landmark and resist being distracted by legalisms.
Some legalisms, to be discussed in the next chapter, relate to the name given to the lawsuit challenging the imprisonment (i.e., whether the action is called one for habeas corpus).
The current topic, though, is legalisms that lead to a misunderstanding even of those actions that do bear the habeas corpus label.
"Perhaps the best known 'rule' concerning habeas corpus was that against controverting the return." 2 In other words, if the jailer responded to the writ ordering production of the prisoner with a document stating some reason that would if true constitute a valid basis for the detention, the court could not inquire into the truth of the reason. This "rule" obscures far more than it illuminates.
In fact, common law judges "routinely considered extrinsic evidence such as in-court testimony, third party affidavits, documents, and expert opinions to scrutinize the factual and legal basis for detention." 3 Employing a variety of procedural devices, they simply nullified the "rule." For instance, after receiving an application for habeas corpus supported by extensive affidavits, the judges might not issue the writ (thereby triggering a return) but rather issue an order requiring the jailer to show cause why the writ should not issue (thereby triggering an confine someone and issuing a binding order of release if the custodian has not shown a factual and legal basis for doing so is a core function of an independent judiciary. That, in substance, is what "habeas corpus" means, 15 as it has for some five hundred years. 16 The most meaningful way to view the past, present, and future of the writ is within that framework.
Habeas Corpus With and Without the Writ Some Illustrative Cases
To show what is lost by confining research into habeas corpus solely to cases bearing that name, this chapter presents a series of cases successfully challenging illegal detentions. Those in section A are labeled "habeas corpus" and those in section B are not. But the cases in section A differ from those in section B only formally, not functionally. The cases in each group not only display factual isomorphism but, as chapter 3 will describe, display common characteristics in judicial approach.
A. Formal Habeas Cases
i. An Unappreciated Constable
In 1714, Charles Banfild was an appointed constable for the town of Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. One of his duties was to collect taxes from the townspeople and remit them to the Selectmen. But things did not go well.
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As Banfild explained to the New Hampshire Superior Court in mid-August of that year, he used his best endeavors to collect but the "people would not pay." And as fast as he hauled the delinquents before the local Justices of the Peace ("J.P.'s") for non-payment, just so fast did the J.P.'s discharge them. This process was interrupted only by his own imprisonment for nonpayment of the taxes to the Selectmen, which he had been unable to end by posting bond so that he might return to his collection efforts.
Banfild complained that his imprisonment was not only most unjust but also manifestly illegal because:
1. his incarceration was contrary to the provincial statute under which he had been appointed, 18 inasmuch as he had sufficient assets to pay the taxes in dispute; and 2. the Selectmen who had first appointed him and then procured his imprisonment were without authority because they had been invalidly chosen; 19 and 3. it could "in no way be justifiable" for him to be imprisoned for not remitting to the Selectmen taxes from those townspeople whose obligations had been discharged by the J.P.'s.
Banfild accordingly sought from the Superior Court "an order . . When the court considered the matter on August 11, 1714, it ordered Banfild to be brought before it. 20 Perhaps considering Banfild a security risk, the sheriff initially refused to obey this order. The irritated court followed up by telling him to bring into court the next day not only Banfild "in safe custody," but also the J.P.'s who had committed him to prison and the Selectmen complained of. This was done and the parties worked out an arrangement for Banfild's prompt release. Banfild and a guarantor would enter into a penal bond under which they agreed to pay twice the amount due unless within five weeks Banfild paid to the Selectmen the taxes they claimed, less the amounts owed by taxpayers whose obligations the J.P.'s had Chief Justice Atkinson that alleged that he was being "unjustly held and detained without any lawful cause for such detainer set forth by the said Ezekial Chase, Esq. in his order of commitment." The justice signed an order granting the writ on June 8; on June 9, Whittemore came before him, posted bail, and was released. When the full court convened at the beginning of September, a paperwork glitch emerged requiring the issuance of another writ of habeas corpus; this took place within a day. 24 In mid-September, the underlying proceedings against Whittemore were quashed without objection.
iii. An Alleged Slave
In New Hampshire, as elsewhere, suits by alleged slaves claiming freedom were common, 25 and there as elsewhere the suits could be brought in many legal forms. One possibility was to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 26 That is what Peter Johnson of Portsmouth, New Hampshire did in the summer of 1748 in claiming that he had been wrongfully "imprisoned for refusing to serve as a slave." 27 The Superior Court ordered that the alleged owner appear, and when he did, the issue of Johnson's status was put to a jury. 28 On its finding Johnson to be free, the court ordered that "he be enlarged and the Sheriff set him at Liberty."
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iv. An Impoverished Service Member
Members of the armed forces in the early 1800s who were imprisoned in violation of a federal statute exempting active duty military personnel from arrest for debt would routinely seek and gain release through writs of habeas corpus. 30 Thus, for example, in May 1814, George Daze presented to US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a petition setting forth that he was "an enlisted seaman in the service of the United States," currently "in confinement in the debtors apartment of the City and County of Philadelphia" by virtue of an execution (a copy of which was attached to the petition) issued on a state court judgment for debt; that "by the provisions of an Act of Congress approved the 11th of July 1798," he was "exempted from all personal arrests for any debt or contract"; and praying for "a Habeas Corpus directed to the keeper of the debtors apartment that he may be discharged according to Law."
The court responded by requiring the keeper of the debtors' apartment to produce Daze "forthwith." The keeper's written return confirmed that Daze had correctly set forth the cause of his detention, and the court signed an order the same day, May 27, 1814, releasing him:
"Discharged. Lois Tarr, to test who had the superior right to possession of herself, the subject of the action.
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The sheriff promptly seized her pendente lite-that is, he took an appearance bond from Nungand the case was tried to a jury. 35 It found in her favor and the same result was reached on appeal, resulting in a ruling that she was "a free woman and that she enjoy her freedom. The court responded by issuing a writ of habeas corpus to have Winter brought before it, which was done the same day. 41 Having reviewed the indenture he produced, and there being "nothing made to appear that the said servant had ever been provided for as in said indenture mentioned and the particular facts complained of appearing to be true"-not to mention that
Winter had not even taught John to read-the court concluded that Winter was not entitled to retain John's custody, which was returned to his mother.
c. A Headless Baby
One particularly dramatic example of a petitioner obtaining release after filing a non-specific demand was the "Case of the Headless Baby" in Massachusetts in 1662-63. 42 A free black woman by the name of Zipporah was suspected of killing her illegitimate child, but because the father was probably the scapegrace nephew of a powerful local aristocrat (rather than another black servant who was being officially blamed), the authorities were in no position to prosecute, and she languished in jail for months. Eventually, she wrote to the court, noting that she (unlike her putative paramour) was being held without bond notwithstanding they were both equally guilty of fornication and "humbly beseech[ing] this honored Court, to call her before you, and to deal with her, as to yor wisedomes and mercy shall see meet, that she may not lye where she is to This document may or may not have been a petition for a writ of habeas corpus technically, 43 but it certainly was one functionally. Responding to her demand to be charged or released, an indictment charging Zipporah with infanticide was presented for consideration to a grand jury; when it refused to indict her, she was freed.
The Benefits of a Functional View: The Past Educating the Present
As chapter 1 showed, the critical privilege protected by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution is a speedy and meaningful judicial examination of the justification for an imprisonment.
Indeed, the Suspension Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been commendably pragmatic in asking whether the system at hand provides an adequate and effective mechanism for independent judicial review of a detention. 44 In answering that question, the court relies heavily on the raw material unearthed by legal historians and presented in legal briefs. Section A of this chapter suggests that those briefs would be enriched, to the enhancement of the court's rulings, if they were written from a functional perspective.
The task of giving content to the Supreme Court's pronouncements rests on the lower courts, which can approach it in various ways. Section B of this chapter describes the pragmatic approach their common law predecessors took.
Section C applies the lessons of this history to a modern litigation arising from the imprisonment of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay.
A. Educating the Supreme Court
If Supreme Court briefs in Suspension Clause cases were written from a functional perspective, they could cite many more cases than they commonly do because they would not limit themselves to cases bearing the "habeas corpus" denomination.
The justification for this approach is simple. The question of why common law litigants seeking release from imprisonment invoked one writ rather than another is (a) simply antiquarian because the writ system vanished generations ago; (b) essentially unanswerable because of the informality of colonial legal recordkeeping and legal practice; 45 and (c) at the end of the day, the wrong question to be asking for present purposes. As the examples in chapter 2 illustrated, when suitors communicated to judges claims of wrongful imprisonment and demanded a judicial inquiry, judges consistently responded in a way that cut through any technical obstructions. This was most certainly a situation in which "no one cared whether wrong writs were used."
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To be sure, as many judges, practitioners, and scholars have elucidated with great effort, 47 there were indeed differences, ones that varied with time and place, 48 among and between the prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, 49 prohibition, 50 and certiorari. 51 Thus, to revisit some examples from chapter 2, it may well be that because Whittemore had been summarily committed by a magistrate and Pearse convicted of contempt by an inferior court, habeas corpus to bring up the body was thought procedurally appropriate in the first instance and certiorari to bring up the record in the second. 52 Similarly, Nung's use of the writ of personal replevin might reflect a view of that writ as being better suited than the writ of habeas corpus to deal with a situation in which neither party was in prison and private actors were imposing the restraint.
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But when placing legal cases into categories, the critical question is for what purpose the categorization is being undertaken. 54 The distinctions among common law writs are of marginal relevance at best to an inquirer whose purpose is obtaining greater insight into the Suspension 
B. Educating the Lower Courts
Once moved to review an imprisonment, the common law courts considered it their duty to see that justice was done, 56 and implemented their view through a predictable series of responses that reflected the environment in which they were working. The environment has since changed, but the judges on today's lower courts would have much to learn from those courts' approach to their task.
i. The Jurisprudential Environment of Common Law Courts
Irrespective of whether they were dealing with habeas corpus, the professional world in which courts operated prior to the middle decades of the nineteenth century was sharply unlike ours.
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The pervasive tendency of judges trying to reach just outcomes was to focus on facts, not law. In particular, two features of the environment discouraged the disposition of cases on legal grounds.
The first was practical: legal authority was hard to come by. Printed law reports were rare at best, 58 and during the early national period legislatures sometimes specifically forbade the publication and citation of judicial opinions. 59 Moreover, court systems frequently did not include superior appellate courts with law-pronouncing powers. 60 Indeed, during the colonial period and beyond, New Hampshire and Massachusetts appeals were normally decided by a second or sometimes a third jury, and a similar practice was followed in post-Independence Pennsylvania. 61 Thus, the common law was for purely practical reasons inherently fact-centric to a degree that we-particularly those of us educated professionally from casebooks consisting largely of appellate court decisions chosen to teach legal doctrines-can only with difficulty appreciate. 62 Second, law determination was difficult intellectually as well as practically. All professional actors understood that the substantive contents of the common law had an objective existence. 63 When they did engage in legal reasoning the judges saw their task as finding that law in cooperation with counsel, 64 not making it. 65 This often involved the serious expenditure of effort. 66 One reason was that statutes, even if accessible, were by no means determinative of the law. They might be part of it, but they did not define or exhaust it. Rather, judges would give them appropriate consideration as evidence of what the law was. 67 As the estimable scholarship of Professor Paul Halliday has confirmed, the marginal role of statutory law applied fully in the field of habeas corpus. Legislative intervention was rare and almost always unnecessary or counterproductive. 68 In any event, finding the correct legal answer required independent judicial consideration of a good deal of data, which included, but was by no means limited to, the pronouncements of legislators, previous judges, scholars, and others. 69 ii. The Common Law Courts' Responses to Prisoners
a. Speed Matters: Facts Beat Law and Settlements Beat Adjudications
In cases involving potentially unlawful imprisonments the judicial orientation toward focusing on facts rather than law was particularly strong. 70 Because, for the logistical and intellectual reasons just described, the facts were commonly easier to find than the law, taking this approach was likely to yield a faster result.
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Consider how the court responded to the habeas corpus petition of Charles Banfild, the hapless tax collector described in chapter 2 (A) (i).
As informative as what it did do-speedily calling all interested parties into the courtroom and coming to a pragmatic resolution to secure Banfild's prompt liberation 72 -is what it did not do. It made no ruling on any of the three perfectly reasonable legal arguments he had presented. Its impulse was to deal with facts, not law. This was the typical approach of a common law court, as the cases in the next few paragraphs illustrate.
On Saturday January 24, 1761, Mrs. Deborah D'Vebre, who had been confined to a private madhouse by her husband, sought habeas corpus in London. 73 The court responded with an order that a medical expert, her nearest relation, and her attorney "be admitted and have free access" to her at all reasonable times "in order to consult with, advise and assist the said Deborah D'Vebre." On Monday, January 26, the court convened to take the affidavit and live testimony of the medical expert, who reported that he had seen no indications of mental disorder. After hearing this, Lord Mansfield said, "Take a writ of habeas corpus: and if this should appear to be the case, we ought to go further." So the keeper of the madhouse brought in Mrs. D'Vebre herself, but "no return was indorsed upon the writ." 74 In interchange with the bench she "appeared to be absolutely free from the least appearance of insanity," and-since she did not wish to return to the madhouse but the court thought that she could not safely be trusted to the custody of her husband-she was released overnight in custody of her attorney. "It afterwards ended in a compromise, and an agreement to separate."
Because fact-finding was faster than law-finding, habeas courts in England dealing with impressment cases often "made findings of fact to avoid reaching particularly difficult questions of law," as Professor Jonathan L. Hafetz has documented.
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A settlement might be even faster. Thus, when in 1779 habeas was sought on behalf of two boys impressed into military service who sought release on the grounds that they were apprentices, Lord Mansfield could likely have issued the writ as a legal matter, 76 but his actual response was that "a shorter way to work" would be for him to issue a warrant to have the boys brought into court to sort the matter out between the claimants to their services. 77 Indeed, many habeas challenges to military impressments never got to court at all because the authorities began internal investigations on receipt of the writ and discharged petitioners who appeared to have been illegally conscripted. Notwithstanding the strong judicial preference to take a fact-specific approach, legal issues might obtrude in two different ways.
First, a procedural technicality might pose a potential delay to reaching the merits. In that case the courts would knock aside the barrier, as happened in the case of the deed-ripper Whittemore whom we saw in chapter 2 (A) (ii). 81 As Professor Stephen I. Vladeck puts it, the writ would "transcend jurisdictions, championing substance (whether the jailer had a legal basis for confining the prisoner) over jurisdictionally-varied procedural forms." 82 This might happen in a variety of ways, including that a nominal rule ceased being enforced in practice or that an actual rule was bent more or less sharply in a particular instance. 83 Indeed, I have not seen any case before 1867 in which an incarcerated petitioner was denied relief on the basis of having made a procedural misstep.
Second, in some instances a ruling on the merits might ineluctably require determination of a legal question. In that case the judges worked actively to see that the core legal issue was stated as narrowly as possible and resolved quickly. 84 For example, as Professor James Oldham reports, when Lord Mansfield had before him a habeas corpus case in which the dispositive question would be whether the conceded fact of petitioner's employment as a liveryman on the Thames exempted him from impressment, the judge assisted counsel in formulating accordingly the issue to be litigated. 85 He proceeded the same way in Somerset. 86 Similarly, in an English case of 1629 reported by Professor Paul Halliday, Margaret
Symonds disrupted a church service by laughing at the preacher in alleged violation of a statute and was imprisoned (although promptly granted bail pendente lite). 87 "All agreed that Margaret had laughed in church. But her case remained surrounded by factual, and thus legal, doubts.
What made Margaret laugh? Was the sermon so bad that she could not help herself? Or was laughter a sign of her contempt for what she considered dubious doctrine? The return to the writ did not say." As the justices of King's Bench approached the case, "There was no mention of precedents, no analogizing to ostensibly similar cases." Instead, the justices construed the statute to apply only to situations in which the disruption was intended to express opposition to the doctrine being taught. Since the return to the writ was silent on that critical legal issue, it failed to show sufficient cause for the detention and "they sent Margaret home."
C. Applying the Lessons in National Security Cases
A skeptical reader might point out that the wrongful imprisonment cases of serious concern today do not arise in the context of disrespectful congregants or insolvent tax collectors. Modern courts are likely to find themselves confronted with claims by the government that the incarceration of a particular individual is vital to public safety in connection with the worldwide struggle against terrorism. Don't we face novel national security problems, so that responses derived from the common law are simply impractical? My answer is no. The approach just described was practical and desirable in national security cases then and is now.
i. Then
There is nothing new about national security crises. The Glorious Revolution-a celebrated landmark in constraining royal power by law-was born in the midst of one. 88 Boumediene and the five other men accused with him. 94 As to five of the men, he found wholly unsupported the government's allegation that they planned to travel to Afghanistan to engage in hostilities against US forces and ordered their release, 95 which indeed took place. 96 As to the final petitioner in this group, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judge Leon's ruling that he had been properly detained and ordered another look at the case in light of growing doubts about the government's factual and legal basis for it. Nung's case suggests that further study of the colonial situation would be warranted. Indeed, Peter Pearse's successful certiorari petition described in chapter 2 (B) (i) noted that he had sought leave to appeal from the inferior court but had been denied. 
